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Estreicher: Negotiating the People's Capital Revised

ARTICLES
NEGOTIATING THE PEOPLE'S CAPITAL
REVISITED
Samuel Estreicher*
[Editor's Note: What follows is the second part of an unofficial
transcript of an off-the-record conversation among three of the labor
movement's leading strategists. (The first installment appeared under
the title Strategy for Labor, 22 J. LAB. RES. 569 (2001), and has been
updated as Strategy for Labor Revisited, available at
http://www.ssrn.com). This second meeting was also convened by C,
or "cooperationist," who had been for more than ten years the
president of a local union, part of a major industrial union, representing
3,000 employees who had been hired to staff a new manufacturing
plant in a Southern town ("Newplant"). Newplant had been widely
touted as a breakthrough in U.S. labor-management relations because it
was consciously designed to promote greater participation of
production and maintenance workers in business decisions and a
"partnership" role for union officials alongside traditional management
officials. In bitterly contested local elections last year, C was voted out
of office and now serves in a staff capacity at the AFL-CIO. A, or
"adversarialist," perhaps surprisingly a longstanding friend of C, is the
research director of another industrial union. A was very active in the
Students for A Democratic Society in the 1960s, and after graduating
from Oberlin College began his career as a labor organizer, working
for a succession of unions that had been active in the McGovernKucinich wing of the Democratic Party. S, or "stay the course," is the
highly respected chief of staff for a national union representing
government workers. Section headings and parenthetical references
are supplied by the editor and do not appear in the original transcript.]

* Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director, Center for Labor and Employment Law, NYU

School of Law. This is a revised, updated version of an article that appeared under the same title in
25 J. LAB. REs. 191 (2004). (c) 2011 by Samuel Estreicher. All rights are reserved.
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I. SETTING THE STAGE

C: Tonight we discuss the future of public sector labor relations in
this country. It would seem quite a success story. In 2010, 8.4 million
government workers were covered by collective agreements out of a
total of 21.03 million workers in the public sector, or a union coverage
rate of 40% (compared to a private sector coverage rate of 7.7%).'

Union-represented government workers now outnumber their private
sector counterparts, even though government work is about one-fifth of
all work in this country.2 What started as a movement of workers
against private capital increasingly is becoming a movement arrayed
against the people's capital.'
S: That's a barbed way to put it. Governments are bureaucracies;
they are not direct representatives of the people. Politics is what moves
government-not intellectual thought, not merit, not performance, not
even efficient delivery of services. Without organization, the people
who do the work, the police, the firefighters, the teachers, the sanitation
workers, will not get a fair shake in that political process. That is what
public sector unionism is about, and it is every bit as legitimate-every
bit as necessary to workplace justice-as collective bargaining for
workers in private companies.
The "tea party" Republicans, echoing the early commentators like
Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter,4 like to "cry wolf." But they
cannot prove that public-sector unions are too strong, that public-sector
workers get paid or are coddled too much, or that cities are nearing
bankruptcy because of the contracts they have agreed. In most
situations, we may get more in benefits, but union-negotiated pay for

1. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, USDL-11-0063, Union Members available at
USDL-l 1-0063],
2011)
[hereinafter
21,
(Jan.
2010
tbl.3
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
2. In 2009, U.S. public-sector workers had a union membership rate (37.4%) that was over
five times that of private-sector employees (7.2%) and accounted for half of total union
membership, even though government work is only one-fifth the size of the private workforce. See
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, USDL-10-0069, Union Members - 2009 tbl.3 (Jan.
22, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01222010.pdf. In 2010,
total U.S. union membership declined by 612,000 and the union membership rate fell to 11.9% from
12.3% the year before. See USDL- 11-0063, supra note 1, at 1.
3. See Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise of
Voluntarism?, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 415 (2010).
4. See Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969). For an updating of this perspective, see John 0.
McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The Case Against Public Sector Unions, POL'Y REv., Aug.-Sept.
2010, at 3, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/43266.
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public workers is quite comparable with what analogous workers in
private firms get. 5 Public management knows how to bargain hard and
make sure contractual gains do not go too far. If anything, government
doesn't play fair. In many states, when the politicians don't like the
outcomes at the bargaining table, they simply pass laws to restrict what
unions can bargain about. 6 If they don't like the interest arbitrator's
award, they claim legislative supremacy. In the federal government, we
can't even bargain over pay or benefits.8
C: Perhaps I went a bit far with my rhetoric. I only wanted to
suggest that, with almost one out of every two union members working
for the government, we are entering a new era. A labor movement so
constituted will determine how labor federations operate on local, state,
and national levels, will shape the strategies for all organized labor. I
am also concerned that with the pressure on public budgets and the
contrasts people draw between government and private-sector pensions
and health benefits, the current rash of anti-union governors, legislators,
and mayors is not a temporary thing, that we are in for stormy weather
for quite some time.
S: All we can do is fight back and teach the Republicans a lesson
during the next election cycle.
C: Maybe. But I am thinking we need to do more to explain better
our positions, to explain that there is a public interest not only in what
the governors and mayors demand but a countervailing public interest in
5. See Alan B. Krueger, Are Public Sector Workers Paid More Than Their Alternative
Wage? Evidencefrom Longitudinal Data and Job Queues, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS
UNIONIZE 217-42 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988); KEITH A. BENDER & JOHN
S. HEYWOOD, NAT'L INST. ON RETIREMENT SEC., CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE,
OUT OF BALANCE? COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR COMPENSATION OVER 20 YEARS 4-5
available at http://www.slge.org/vertical/Sites/%7BA260E IDF-5AEE-459D-84C4(2010),
876EFE1E4032%7D/uploads/%7BO3E820E8-FOF9-472F-98E2-F0AE1l66Dl1l 6%7D.pdf; JEFFREY
H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY. INST., EPI BRIEFING PAPER No. 290, ARE WISCONSIN PUBLIC
http://www.epi.org/page/(2011),
available at
EMPLOYEES
OVER-COMPENSATED?
/old/briefingpapers/BriefingPaper290.pdf. See generally DAVID LEWIN ET AL., EMP'T POLICY
RESEARCH NETWORK, LABOR & EMP'T RELATIONS ASSN., GETTING IT RIGHT: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FROM RESEARCH ON PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1792942.

6. See, e.g., David J. Strom & Stephanie S. Baxter, From the Statehouse to the Schoolhouse:
How Legislaturesand Courts Shaped Labor Relations for PublicEducation Employees During the
Last Decade, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 275, 292-96 (2001) (providing examples of state legislatures passing
laws to restrict what public sector education employees can bargain about).
7. John Lund & Cheryl L. Maranto, Public Sector Labor Law: An Update, in PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 21-57 (Dale Belman, Morley Gunderson &
Douglas Hyatt eds., 1996).
8. See JON 0. SHIMABUKURO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 1-3 (2011).
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what public workers are demanding. In the schools, for example, we
want fairness for teachers, to recognize that a long-service teacher is
more valuable because of her experience, not to be jettisoned because
some young "Teach for America" graduate has helicoptered in and needs
to be kept happy. For the cops and firefighters, they have a right to more
pay and benefits because they lay their lives on the line every single
working day. The government union movement is about fairness-bring
merit to the fore, pushing politics to the background.
A: You should have been in public relations. Gompers said it a
long time ago-we are not running things; we are about getting "more"
for our members. The politicians are about managing the place; and
they are responsible for their bad decisions, for not financing our pay
and benefit improvements appropriately, for not cleaning the streets, for
allowing the bad apples to roam the school hallways.
II. LEVERAGING PUBLIC-SECTOR UNION POWER TO HELP PRIVATESECTOR WORKERS

C: Maybe. Let's shift the discussion a bit. How can we use union
strength in the public sector to improve the dismal state of union
representation among private employees?
S: A lot already has been done (and, of course, more can be done).
We are the principal political force in getting Democrats elected to
office. President Obama is doing what he can to use the procurement
power to get responsible labor relations behavior from government
contractors. We have also put our political muscle behind organizing the
unorganizable in the home health care field, where the real "employer"
is the state funding agency. Major building projects in many states and
localities use "project labor agreements" to make sure that construction
work financed by government uses union labor.9
A: I would add to the mix the political clout of public- and privatesector pension funds, which hold 11% of the U.S. equity market.
Activism by the California public pension fund ("CALPERS") and
others around the country promotes not only shareholder rights but,
more to the point, provides a lever for inducing corporate social
responsibility in employment and other areas of decision-making.'o C
9. See generally Benjamin 1. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and
States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011).
10. See generally David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets:
EmpiricalEvidence on the Effects of GovernanceStructures and Practices,39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
187 (2005).
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speaks of the "people's capital"; this is the way to make sure that the
people's capital is deployed for the people's needs!
C: All well and good. But aren't there some problems here we
should not be ignoring? For example, are these pension funds doing a
good job of representing the interests of plan participants, or are they
taking on risky projects that will leave retirees high and dry? Who
actually controls these enormous public funds: Is it the unions or the
politicians?
A: There are unfunded liabilities out there," but we haven't had
any public-sector pension failures. There is plenty of latitude for
choosing among socially responsible projects without sacrificing retiree
welfare. 12
C: But the returns aren't all in. These are, as you know, "pay as
you go" defined benefit plans; there is very little advance funding of the
type required of private pensions under the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). If the stock market keeps going south,
many of these funds will be in trouble. And if the funds have to be
bailed out, future generations will pay.1
III. LESSONS FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR

C: Before we turn to some of the issues that are specific to public
sector labor relations, are there any lessons from the public experience
for organizing in private firms?
A: The principal lesson is that workers, public and private, want
(and will get) collective representation if they have no reasons to fear
losing their jobs in the process. 14 Public workers are no different, in what
they want and need, than private workers; and yet one of every two
government workers is under a labor contract, compared to less than one
in ten in private companies. The reason for the difference is that private

11. See generally Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Policy Options for State Pension
Systems and Their Impact on Plan Liabilities, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 173 (2011); Robert
Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 191 (2009).

12.

See Teresa Ghilarducci, Employee Representation on Pension Investment Boards: An

Economic Model of the Pension Contract, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING
WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY 50m ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 703-724 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998).

13. See Roberta Romano, Pension Funds and Corporate Governance, in EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION, supra note 12, at 493-511; Roberta Romano, Public Pension FundActivism in
CorporateGovernance Reconsidered,93 COLUM. L. REv. 795 (1993).
14.

See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999).
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employers by means lawful and unlawful have effectively conveyed the
message to their employees: seek out a union but only if you don't care
about keeping your job. In the government sector, however, once the
jurisdiction comes to support the principle of collective representation
for its workers, the pitched battle comes to an end; workers can then
decide whether to unionize without fear of retaliation.' 5
What the public sector experience teaches is that we need risk-free
card check certification procedures for private workers under the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The representation question is
simply no business of the employers.
C: We have been over this ground before.' 6 I agree that public- and
private-sector workers are likely to have the same underlying
preferences. And, sure, we've got to stiffen penalties for unlawful
employer opposition under the NLRA. 17 But we shouldn't lose sight of
the fact that most public employers operate as virtual monopolies, and
for that reason are less concerned over the costs of, and hence less likely
to resist, unionization and, until recently, union bargaining objectives.
Moreover, they operate in a political environment, which makes them
reluctant to take strikes and highly responsive to the pressures that
organized constituencies like labor can bring to bear. We can pass laws
to make it easier for unions to organize private workers, but these larger
differences in the bargaining environment cannot be legislated away.
For me, a key lesson of the public sector experience is its tolerance
of a variety of approaches to how employee organizations can take form.
Unlike the NLRA, nonunion employee representation committees are
often lawful;' "meet and confer" laws permit an alternative short of fullscale collective bargaining;' 9 and supervisor unionism is generally
permitted. 2 0 We also have a strong tradition of career-based
15. See Casey Ichniowski, Public Sector Union Growth and Bargaining Laws: A
Proportional Hazards Approach with Time-Varying Treatments, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR
WORKERS UNIONIZE, supranote 5, at 19-38.

16. See Samuel Estreicher, Strategyfor Labor, 22 J. LAB. RES. 569 (2001).
17. See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the NationalLabor Relations Act
Without Statutory Change,25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (2009).
18. See Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation: A Legal/Policy Perspective,
in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY

106, 216 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000).
19. See Lund & Maranto, supra note 7.
20. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Wearing Two Hats: The Unionizationof Public
Sector Supervisors, in GOING PUBLIC: THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN
DELIVERING QUALITY GOVERNMENT SERVICES 295 (Jonathan Brock & David B. Lipsky eds.,

2003); Stephen L. Hayford & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Bargaining Rights Status of Public Sector
Supervisors, 15 INDUS. REL. 44 (1976).
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professionals. 2 1
IV. EDUCATIONAL REFORM
S: Enough of this private-sector stuff. You're both suffering from
the same myopia as the law schools, where they pore over the details of
an (increasingly irrelevant) NLRA with nary a word about government
workers.
C: Good. If you don't mind, let's start with educational reform.
Why are the teacher unions (and here I include the National Education
Association) so opposed to improvements in the public schools? 22
S: Your question surprises me. The teacher unions are not opposed
to reform; they are opposed to privatization of our common schools. We
have been in the forefront of responsible charter school legislation which
preserves hard-fought contractual commitments. In the traditional
public schools themselves, we have supported site-based decisionmaking, peer review of teacher performance, and productivity
improvements in exchange for higher pay.23
C: Maybe it's a misperception, but (I suspect) one generally held,
that the teacher unions are a major obstacle to school reform, especially
in the inner city schools. From a quick scan of the news it seems that the
unions doggedly fight to keep in place bad teachers, insist on
certification requirements that prevent young college graduates from
entering the field without taking pointless teacher education courses, and
oppose vouchers even as a remedy for failing schools.
S: You're right about vouchers. They are an unmitigated disaster,
that will deprive the inner city schools you care about of needed flunding
and will lead to taxpayer-financed private schools that teach sectarian, in
some cases hate-filled, doctrine. You're only half right about
certification. Teaching is a profession that builds on acquired skills; it is
not something you can do well coming off the streets with a college
degree in postmodernism. We do not oppose the hiring of uncertified
teachers; we do insist that teacher pay be linked to formal education in
teaching skills.

21. See CHARLES TAYLOR KERCHNER & JULIA E. KOPPICH, A UNION OF PROFESSIONALS:
LABOR RELATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1993).
22. See MYRON LIEBERMAN, THE TEACHER UNIONS: How THEY SABOTAGE EDUCTIONAL
REFORM AND WHY (2000).

23. See Saul A. Rubinstein & John E. McCarthy, Collaboratingon School Reforn: Creating
Union-Management Partnerships to Improve School Systems (Rutgers Univ., Sch. of Mgmt. &
Labor Relations, 2010), availableat http://smlr.rutgers.edulcontent/collaborating-school-reform.
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On the other discipline point, you are simply wrong. We do not
manage the schools; we represent teachers. Tenure was hard-fought; it
is absolutely necessary if teachers are to be a force for independent
thinking, for civilization in the schools. If a teacher fails to perform to
standard, and that standard has been clearly announced, let the school
board make its case. Often the principals are looking for a scapegoat,
and it is our job to make sure that teachers are held accountable only for
their shortcomings, not management's.
There's a lot of faddism here. Recall, we opposed politicization
through Ford Foundation-funded decentralization of New York City
schools in the 1960s. Now after four decades of local school board
corruption, the powers that be all agree that centralized accountability
for New York schools is what's needed. Vouchers, the Edison School
projects will share this same fate.
V.

PRIVATIZATION

A: Let's turn to the issue of privatization. What position should
labor take here? As I read the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") law on this subject, privatized (former government) workers
now to have the right to strike.24 If I am right, should this change our
thinking?
S: I am not a lawyer, but doubt the NLRB decisions go as far as
you suggest. In any event, we oppose privatization, because it is not in
the public interest. Inevitably, private management results in a loss of
public accountability and introduction of a profit element which requires
deterioration in the quality of services. When public services privatize,
this only means that a private manager is being substituted for a
government body. Competition is not introduced for uniquely public
services-such as police and fire protection-that are provided by
government precisely because there is no private alternative.25
C: But you can't take an ostrich's approach here. If government
finds itself under budgetary pressure, it is going to look for lower cost
alternatives.
S: Of course, that is why despite our opposition in principle, we
take a pro-active approach. We first want to be involved in the decision24. See Spectrum Healthcare Servs., Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 1061 (1998); Aramark Corp., 323
N.L.R.B. 256 (1997), enforced, 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Mgmt. Training Corp.,
317 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1995).
25. See ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, ECON. POL. INST., THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE:
LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES (1997).
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making process, for often we can convince the public authority that the
gains anticipated from privatization are largely illusory. We also work
closely with the public body to explore how existing services can be
more efficiently provided under public management. 26 If the decision is
go to private management, we then insist on contractual guarantees of
continued employment, a right of first refusal for jobs with the
contractor, payment of prevailing wages and benefits, and continuation
of union recognition. 27
VI. LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

S: What we are doing to avert privatization is of a piece with daily
instances of labor-management cooperation to help government work
smarter without undermining union standards. 28 The key is worker
empowerment-treating your people with respect, motivating them to
share their know-how, sharing the gains from working together, and
providing ongoing assurance of job security.
VII. THE CHALLENGE

C: Despite your excellent advocacy, I still see trouble ahead. As
former president Clinton put it, "the era of Big Government is over."
Even the Democrats we're helping put in office sound like fiscal
conservators. Public concern over the cost and inefficiency of
government will embolden politicians to find ways of doing without
certain services, subcontracting or privatizing others, and insisting on
limits on the scope of collective bargaining. Even when the "tea party"
folks leave the scene, this is a challenge to public-sector unions that they
will not be able to ignore.
S: But we have been and are meeting the challenge. Government
will not get smaller. Given 9/11, national and homeland defense will
claim a larger share of public resources. So will environmental
concerns: getting our economy on a "green" footing. Since the 1980s,
26. See Michael Glanzer, Union Strategies in Privatizations: Shakespeare-Inspired
Alternatives, 64 ALB. L. REV. 437, 458-70 (2000).
27. See AM. FED'N OF STATE, CNTY. & MUN. EMPs., AFL-CIO, GOVERNMENT FOR SALE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CONTRACTING OUT OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES (8th ed.),
http://www.afscme.org/newsat
available
publications/publications/privatization/pdf/GovemmentSale.pdf.
28. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: REPORT OF THE
U.S. SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
THROUGH LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (1996).
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we have gotten smarter at what we do-more willing to explore
gainsharing improvements in productivity, relying more on legislation
than collective bargaining to secure gains. In the public sector, labor has
an effective voice, and there are spillover benefits for all workers. The
challenge is for public management to do its job better, not for labor to
concede its position.
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